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M. Jagath

Disaster Management Center, Ministry of Disaster Management, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

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Strengths and Weaknesses of the Resettlement Process in the Post Disaster Era: A Case Study of Aranayake, Kegalle, Sri Lanka

Jagath, M.

Disaster Management Center
Ministry of Disaster
Management
Colombo, Sri Lanka
jagathm@dmc.gov.lk

Abstract

This paper discusses, in the form of a case study, the resettlement process of Aranayake that took place in 2016. In Aranayake, 512 families have resettled at ten relocation sites or at their own residences. This study explores the strengths and weaknesses of this resettlement process via interviews of government officials, selected families, and other stakeholders. Many expressed displeasures at their living conditions after resettlement. However, some respondents were satisfied as they had easy access to basic needs and were free of landslide risks. The study used a qualitative methodology. Data was gathered from structured questionnaires, interviews, and focused group discussions. The research was conducted two years after the resettlement, and studied the participants' socio-economic condition, physical movement, their newly adopted lifestyles, engagement with government and other administrative entities, settlers' response to the norms of the host communities, their attitudes towards different housing schemes (owner-driven, government-driven, donor-driven) in the same location, and their satisfaction regarding government provisions (financial allocation systems and other support). The study also explores the local and international donors' contributions to internally displaced people (IDPs). The findings show that the resettlement process did not adequately address the requirements of the displaced community. In the post-disaster era, families who resettled have experienced a deterioration in their socio-economic status. However, the newly introduced financial schemes for IDPs was identified as a strength of the resettlement process. Hence, this study proposes the adoption of globally accepted resettlement attributions, which may enable sustainable restitution for displacement in Sri Lanka.

Keywords: *Internally displaced people, Post disaster era, Resettlement*

Introduction

In 2016, the South-West monsoon caused severe landslides and floods in Sri Lanka. This heavily affected the Central Hills and the Sabaragamuwa Province, particularly Aranayake, Kegalle. The Aranayake incident led to disaster-induced resettlement in the country. As McClean (2021) states, “disaster displacement is a great humanitarian challenge of the 21st century” (p. 1).

This study focuses on the successes and failures of the resettlement process which spanned over two years. The relocation efforts, which had a limited number of beneficiaries, were sustained through the government and donors. Highly prioritized resettlement projects, such as Aranayake, Kegalle and Meeriyabedda, Badulla were being implemented with the assistance of armed forces. Though it enabled the timely and effective completion of these projects, it limited the involvement of beneficiary families in the projects, leading to some negative consequences, including the families experiencing shock and stress. At the district disaster management committee meeting, which discussed the revision of land policies and resettlement policies, laws and recommendations, which was held on 25th July, 2017 at the District Secretariat, Kegalle, it was decided to get ideas of all stakeholders including beneficiaries when implementing resettlement programs. Hence, all the Initiatives followed a centralized mechanism, and were mostly regulated through district and divisional housing development committees.

This resettlement process was implemented under three schemes; state driven housing schemes, owner driven housing schemes, and donor driven housing schemes. All these three implications were monitored by the divisional secretariat and the district secretariat officials with the support of relevance technical agencies. Therefore, the funds were used under the supervision of the government. Hence, all donors adhered to the guidelines issued by the district disaster management committee during project implementation.

Table 1 shows that only 175 families received donor support. However, these donations were not equally distributed among these 175 beneficiaries. While some relocation sites were built with full support of national and international donors, others received partial support. This violated one of the guiding principles mentioned under section-1 of the general principles governing internally displaced people. In October, 2004 Jan Eagland as Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) of United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) the second edition published of Guiding Principles (GPs) highlighting the importance of this article. It reads:

Internally displaced persons shall enjoy, in full equality, the same rights and freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in their country. They shall not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of any rights and freedoms on the ground that they are internally displaced. (UNOCHA, 2004, p.07)

Table 1: Details of donor driven constructions

Site name	Donor agency or person	No. of houses
Wasanthagama Site	Senehesiyapatha Project	30
Wasanthagama Site	Rhino Project	20
Wasanthagama Site	Kanaka Herath Foundation	01
Wasanthagama Site	Bahrain Sri Lanka Engineering Institute	01
Wasanthagama Site	Sri Lanka Red Cross Society	01
Wasanthagama Site	Mrs. Nilani Piyasena	01
Wasanthagama Site	NSB Bank	01
Kalugala Site	Habitat Institute	40
Ruwandeniya Housing Complex Site	Chinese Embassy	60
Duldeniya Site	Caritas Institute	16
Kalugala Site	Bahrain Sri Lanka Association	02
Wilpala Site	Air Force Seva Vanitha Unit	01
Gawilipitiya Town	Air Force Seva Vanitha Unit	01
Total		175

Source: Author, 2021

The relocation process was implemented in the Aranayake divisional secretariat division which comprised more than 15 Grama Niladhari Divisions (GND) in ten relocation sites. During the process, the authorities grouped displaced people without considering their original GNDs.

It was seen that globally accepted configurations were adhered to in the site selection process. Well-known relocation sites such as, Tacloba in the Philippines, Hoa Binh Province, Northern Vietnam Mekong Delta, Central Mozambique, Surakarta City in Indonesia, Carterets Atoll Autonomous Region of Bougainvillea, Papua New Guinea, Panabaj and Tz'anchaj Districts, Guatemala, Central, Eastern and Western Oromia Region-Ethiopia, and Somalia (Weerasinghe & Bower, 2021) have used different spatial patterns for site selection and displaced communities were involved in the design of the site. They were also given assistance on their return or resettlement. This has not happened in Aranayake. Nevertheless, in the identifications of sites, globally accepted configurations have been used.




Figure 1: Spatial patterns of different destinations and different origins

Source: Weerasinghe and Bower, 2021

The above spatial patterns of countries are used in the disaster relocations process in Asia and Africa. In Aranayake, these spatial patterns were theoretically adapted in the sites but they have not shown the expected results. A discussion on this is given below.

01. Wasanthagama relocation site (pattern A - single origin – single destination).

This is the principal relocation site. All settlers were from Ellagapitiya GND, which was directly affected by landslides. The site was funded by the government and third-party donors. It consisted of sufficient resources and infrastructure facilities. The community comprised 55 Households (HH), that were relatives or neighbours. The site extent was 55 plots, and each plot consisted of 10 perches.

02. Kalugala relocation site (pattern B - multiple origin – single destination)

This was another relocation site of affected families, their relatives and neighbours. It was funded by the government and third-party donors. It also had sufficient resources and infrastructures facilities. The community was from Ellagapitiya and Debathgama GNDs. Its 35 HH consisted of relatives or neighbours. They were given 20 perches which was the largest plot size in the Aranayake resettlement project.

03. Habalakkawa relocation site (pattern C - single origin – multiple destination)

This was one of the sites with single origin resettlement, where families lived with adequate facilities such as water since the beginning of the project. The site was funded by the government, and had sufficient infrastructure facilities. The community was from Ellagapitiya GND and consists of 51 HH of relatives or neighbours. They received 15

perches each. As the ground stability of the site had varied considerably, the community has raised concerns regarding impending landslide risks and the difficulty in accessing their residences that are at high elevations. The site was divided into three subsections as the upper region, lower region, and mid region.

04. Panapura Watte relocation site (pattern B - multiple origin –single destination)

This site has a high catholic population, as the planned relocation tried to concentrate the catholic community into one site, which has led to many socio-cultural issues. The community is still not clear why this decision was taken. All the houses were constructed with the support of donors and the government. All families were granted 15 perches each, but adequate attention was not given to infrastructure development.

05. Weragoda-Abadeniya Watte relocation site (pattern B–multiple origin–single destination)

The government acquired this site, a total land extent of 35 acres, from an individual and 54 families from Narangama, Gavilipitiyagama, and Weragoda GNDs were settled there. These residents were not adversely affected by the South-West monsoon. Families received 15 perches each and construction was funded by the government. The residents have access to work, transport, and other essentials.

06. Thalammala-Gammale Watte relocation site (pattern B–multiple origin–single destination)

37 families were relocated in this site with adequate facilities. However, the respondents complained of not having drinking water. Constructions have also been delayed due to the unavailability of water. Beneficiaries received 15 perches each with the right for cultivation and home gardening, as 99% of the population are farmers of chena cultivations and daily wage earners.

07. Ruwandeniya-Weediyamankadahena relocation site (pattern A – single origin –single destination)

5 families from Weragoda GND settled in this location. They were neighbours who acquired personal land and houses constructed by the government. Their post-disaster living condition was satisfactory as each family was given 15 perches of land.

08. Debathgama Watte relocation site (pattern D – multiple origin –multiple destination)

This is one of the largest sites of the Aranayake relocation project, where 20 perches were distributed among 42 families from Weragoda and Kalugala. This site is situated adjoining the Kalugala site and was adequately supervised and supported by the technical team. However, travelling to the site is difficult, and it lacks infrastructure facilities.

09. Weragoda-Abadeniya Watte relocation site (pattern B – multiple origin –single destination)

This is a new site with 60 HH with two stories. Each block has 4 houses. The site was donated by the Chinese government. The beneficiaries received rights to the houses but not the land. Although this was criticized by many parties at the beginning, it was later accepted due to the quality of the complex. All the houses were in close proximity, and residents had to learn to co-exist, which many respondents agreed they could do.

10. Duldeniya Watte relocation site (pattern A – single origin –single destination)

This site is in a paddy field without elevation, with easy access to resources. 16 families who came from Rahala GND live here in harmony with each other and the host community. The total extent of the site is 06 acres, and each family has 15 perches of land.

Many respondents confirmed that a lot of factors were considered during the relocation. Some, however, did not have the legal right to the land at the time of the research, which is not a positive sign. Fernando (2018) says the following about land ownership:

Land ownership is an important indicator for livelihood security as it serves not only as a legally accepted place to live but also as it can be used as an economic resource. i.e. place for production, security for bank loans, mortgage and can even be sold in times of crisis. (p.78)

Hence it is clear that institutions must provide technological provisions in order to ensure landownership. With such a requirement, this paper evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the Aranayake landslide resettlement project.

Research Methodology

The aim of this paper is to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the Aranayake resettlement project, with the objective of addressing such weaknesses in future resettlement programs through implementing policies and adopting global standards in displacement and resettlement.

Designing the study area.

Table 2 describes the number of participants of the focus group discussions, case studies, and the questionnaire. The target population was 383 families who resettled at ten relocation sites in Aranayake. Simple random sampling method was used. About 68 responders were government officials such as District Secretaries, Divisional Secretaries, Grama Niladaharies, disaster management officers, other ground level officials, and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)/International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO)

participants, while the rest were members of the relocated families. The majority of the resettled people displayed similarities in life style and education. All the data were analyzed descriptively.

Table 2: The number of families selected from each location

No.	Resettlement site name/ Focal point persons	No. of families settled	No. of families surveyed
1	Wasanthagama	55	32
2	Kalugala	35	21
3	Habalakkawa	51	38
4	Panapura watta	28	23
5	Weragoda (Abadeniya watte)	54	49
6	Thalgammala (Gammale watte)	37	19
7	Ruwandeniya (weediyamankadahena)	5	5
8	Debathgama watte	42	26
9	Ruwandeniya (Udaweharathanne)	60	58
10	Duldeniyawatte	16	11
11	Focal point persons (Government officials and NGO/INGO stakeholders)		68
	Total	383	350

Source: Author, 2021

Analysis and Discussion

According to the guiding principles for the Internal Displacement Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) introduced by Dr. Francis M. Deng (2001, pp. 05-17), IDPs have fundamental rights such as;

- I. the right to seek safety in another part of the country,
- II. the right to leave their country,
- III. the right to seek asylum in another country, and
- IV. the right to be protected against forcible return.

These fundamental rights should be protected in the resettlement process. The Pinheiro principles on Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) introduced by the Center on Housing Rights and Eviction (Pinheiro, 2005) also ensure these rights. The principles state the following:

All the refugees and displaced persons have the right to have restored to them any housing, and and/or property which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived, or to be compensated for any housing, land and/or property that is factually impossible to restore as determined by an independent, impartial tribunal. (Pinheiro, 2005, p.09)

Every government has an obligation to protect and provide shelter for displaced people without discrimination. The Pinheiro principles further clarify these requirements as follows:

States shall demonstrably prioritize the right to restitution as the preferred remedy for displacement and as a key element of restorative justice. The right to restitution exists as a distinct right, and is prejudiced neither by the actual return nor non-return of refugees and displaced persons entitled to housing, land property or restitution. (Pinheiro, 2005, p. 09)

Following these recommendations, over sixty-eight (68.69) acres were allocated in Aranayake for resettlement under three schemes; owner driven, donor driven, and state driven.

Some families, despite being directly affected by the landslide, were rejected by the government due to insufficient documentation to prove their residency and land rights in Aranayake. This is a violation of fundamental rights, which needs to be addressed with the support of international experts.

This paper identifies the availability of adequate land, which is a total of 68.69 acres, as a strength of the resettlement process.

Table 3: Number of families settled at each site

No.	Site name	No. of families settled
1	Wasanthagama	55
2	Kalugala	35
3	Habalakkawa	51
4	Panapura watta	28
5	Weragoda (Abadeniya watta)	54
6	Thalgammala (Gammale watta)	37
7	Ruwandeniya (weediyanankadahena)	5
8	Debathgama watta	42
9	Ruwandeniya (Udaweharathanne)	60
10	Duldeniyawatta	16
	Total	383

Source: Author, 2021

All 10 sites were surveyed by the National Building Research Organization (NBRO). Additionally, all the plots and site plans were drawn by the NBRO under the supervision of Divisional Secretariat (DS) officials with the participation of other stakeholders. This is seen as a strength that ensured the participation and consultation of multiple stakeholders. The following are some other strengths of the project.

01. Lands, plots and the house plans were approved by NBRO.

All the relocation sites were approved by authorities before they were considered for resettlement. Next, the ‘landslide free report’ with guidelines for further development was issued free of charge. The plot demarcations were given by the NBRO who also decided the number of houses at each site. After demarcating the boundaries and plot numbers, the NBRO gave their approval to begin construction.

Further, according to the sites’ characteristics, several house plans (3 main plans) were designed by the NBRO. If any household needed different designs/plans, they could be presented to the NBRO and the local authorities for approval (see figures 2, 3, and 4).

02. Global experiences regarding resettlement were studied.

In the Aranayake resettlement program, donors’ global disaster recovery experiences and house plans were used. For example, the Ruwandeniya site with 60 houses (see figure 5) was designed and funded by the Chinese government. The house plans these donors developed were approved by the NBRO and separate exhortation guidelines were given. Funds were not rejected, and the people who benefited from the project have become resilient against future threats.

03. Global standards on settlement were maintained.

The guidelines to construct a safe house included in the publication by the NBRO published in 2016 included minimum standards for shelters. Such globally recognized resettlement standards were included in the house plans and were maintained by the NBRO.

According to the standards, the minimum area of a house should be 650 square feet and should consist of 2 bed rooms, a living room, a kitchen, and a water sealed toilet. Such core house plans were the standard under this scheme (see figure 6).




Figure 2: NBRO-Human settlement division – Core house plan I

Source: NBRO, 2016




Figure 3: NBRO-Human settlement division – Core house plan II

Source: NBRO, 2016




Figure 4: NBRO-Human settlement division – Core house plan III

Source: NBRO, 2016



Figure 5: Constructions at the Ruwandiya relocation site – Sponsored by the Chinese Government

Source: Author, 2018




Figure 6: Features of the core house plan

Source: NBRO, 2016

04. Selection of beneficiaries and locations.

The selection of beneficiaries for relocation was a challenging task. Hence, several strategic approaches were used when choosing beneficiaries. They were, making the choice based on the first come, first served basis, a lottery system, the wish of the beneficiary, and the wish of the donor. Allocation of prime sites for identified beneficiaries was also done. Beneficiaries responded that they were happy about the sites.

05. Land plot size.

Plots in different resettlement areas were of different sizes. However, within a given site, all the plots were of the same size. This was decided on three grounds; the most comfortable

site – 10 perches per plot (e.g.-: Wasanthagama), the more comfortable site – 15 perches per plot (e.g.-: Habalakkawa); and the comfortable site – 20 perches per plot (e.g.-: Kalugala).

06. Providing infrastructure facilities

Infrastructure facilitation is an important aspect of any resettlement zone. Hallegatte et al. (2019) say the following on infrastructure facilities:

When disasters affect infrastructure services, even the households and companies not directly affected by the shocks experience impacts. People are sometimes left without electricity or water for weeks or more. They are also affected indirectly through impacts on businesses—such as reduced productivity and competitiveness—which in turn affect their ability to provide the jobs, incomes, and goods and services on which people depend. (p. 27)

This shows that protecting and providing infrastructure is a challenge for stakeholders and that it often leads to discrimination. However, as most of the settlement locations of Aranayake were newly constructed, some people were provided adequate infrastructure (see figure 7) including roads, electricity, water, community centers, medical centres, and schools.



Figure 7: Community center at the Kalugala relocation site – A donation from Wattala Lions Club

Source: Author, 2018

07. Establishing a disaster resilience financial allocation system.

A financial allocation system was newly introduced at the Aranayake resettlement program. Before the incident, Rs 100,000.00 was given for fully damaged houses while Rs 50,000.00 was given for partially damaged houses. The provision was made based on the damage assessment.

However, several new initiatives started after the Aranayake incident. This was a historical change in resettlement in Sri Lanka. Financial assistance of Rs 2.5 Mn was provided for a fully damaged house under the National Insurance Trust Fund (NITF). For partially damaged houses, assistance was given after the damage assessment. If the damage was over Rs. 10, 000.00, the amount was given to the beneficiaries the very next day through the respective Divisional Secretariat (DS) offices.

Additionally, a separate financial scheme was launched for residents of high-risk zones. Under this scheme, the beneficiary received Rs.1.6 Mn in restitution. Most beneficiaries, however, wanted to receive a house, which was also seen in Aranayake.




Figure 8: Financial allocation for high risks families

Source: National Disaster Relief Service Center (NDRSC), 2017

08. Agreements for house construction.

The beneficiaries and the Divisional Secretariat had the responsibility of completing the project without delays. Respecting the universal declaration of human rights, article 12 which states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation” (UN-OHCHR, 1948, p. 04), beneficiaries were advised to demolish the old house before receiving the 05th (last) installment.

Furthermore, the United Nations principles on housing and property restitution for refugees and displaced person state that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement and the right to choose his or her residence. No one shall be arbitrarily or unlawfully forced to remain within a certain territory, area or region” (Pinheiro, 2005, p. 11). These guidelines

were respected in the project, and the installment scheme (given below) was followed during the project (all amounts indicated in LKR).

1st installment: land clearance, foundation layering: 150,000.00

2nd installment: construction up to roof level: 300,000.00

3rd installment: finishing doors, windows and roof: 450,000.00

4th installment: finishing, electricity suppliers, and toilet construction.: 300,000.00

5th installment: 25000.00 - retentions from any of the above until the NBRO's final certificate and deed are received.

Total: 1200,000.00

09. Providing the opportunity to move across the country.

The relocation process enabled the beneficiaries to move from Aranayake Divisional Secretariat Division (DSD) to other DSDs or districts, so long as they adhered to the guidelines issued by the NBRO.

Table 4: Number of families that moved away from Aranayake DSD

No. of families	Area of relocation
15	Out of Aranayake division but within district
12	Out of the Kegalle district

Source: Author, 2021

This movement saves them from future catastrophe. Five persons interviewed stated their dislike to stay in Aranayake considering future threats. Many relocated people were doubtful at the beginning, but later learnt how to become resilient to disasters.

10. Establishing a close monitoring mechanism.

One of the most important initiatives of the project was establishing a monitoring mechanism. At resettlement, beneficiaries agreed to a new life style, which comes with their new shelter. The Disaster Management Center (DMC), National Building Research Organization (NBRO), Divisional Secretary (DS), Grama Niladhari (GN) and other relevant authorities monitored the projects following advice given by district and divisional disaster and housing committees. The technical officers assigned to visit sites monitored the constructions by making records on the booklet that included the 'Construction guidance check list'.




Figure 9: Booklet with the ‘construction guidance check list’ published by the NBRO

Source: NBRO, 2017

Modern technology was used to monitor the progress of construction. It helped to assess, address shortcomings, and drive the project to completion. A database app was developed for monitoring and ensuring that the project achieves the resettlement objectives.




Figure 10: App developed by the NBRO for monitoring purposes of constructions at Aranayake

Source: NBRO, 2017

Further, sites were monitored using UAV/Drone technology. This led to feedback from stakeholders.



Figure 11: Wasanthagama resettlement site being monitored using UAV/Drone technology

Source: NBRO, 2017

Hence, it is seen that the project had many strengths. However, several shortcomings of the resettlement process were also identified. They are listed below.

1. Waste of valuable resources.

68.69 acres of fertile land in and around Aranayake DSD were used for the project. Fertile rubber, tea, and coconut cultivations were removed and land was cleared. However, it was seen that all 10 sites could have been set up in one location. Hence, it was evident that a large extent of land was wasted.

2. Negative impact on the environment.

26 families rejected the resettlement process, stating that the houses were not constructed in an environment friendly manner (e.g., the Ruwandeniya relocation site). Land became barren and many villagers were not comfortable with the built environment.

3. Unequal distribution of basic resources and infrastructure.

Some areas lacked basic facilities. For instance, Ruwandeniya, Wasanthagama, and Kalugala were the only sites that received community centers. Some locations (like Habalakkawa and Panapura watte sites) struggled to even find drinking water. Such imperative factors that could have contributed to the success of the projects were lacking in some areas.

4. Contradictions in funding by the NITF and NDRSC.

In the Duldeniya relocation site, 16 families received funding as a one-time payment. Families of all the other 9 sites received funding in 5 installments (see table 5) due to the irresponsibility of officials.

Table 5: Cash grant delivery system introduced by the government

Installment	Stage	Installment (Rs.)
1	Land preparation and excavation	40,000.00
2	Completion of foundation	110,000.00
3	Completion of wall up to roof level including door/ window frames	300,000.00
4	Completion of roof and door/ window (sashes)	450,000.00
5	Completion of core-house –Plastering, finishing, painting, toilet and electrical connection	300,000.00
Total		1,200,000.00

Source: Author, 2021

5. Not considering socio-cultural dimensions.

Fernando (2018) states that “[w]ith regard to livelihood strategies, [it is] important to consider social relationships as an asset to cope with various risks, shocks, and stress situations” (p. 169). Thus, in resettlement, the profile of the displaced community needs to be considered. In this project however, such a consideration was not done. For instance, the Duldeniya relocation site had a culturally mixed population, and one participant expressed concern over possible friction among different religious communities. Her fears can be analyzed as follows:

- I. the sudden human mobility leads to vulnerability due to resistance to adapt,
- II. people face shocks, stress, and strain,
- III. families lack space and facilities,
- IV. people’s relationships become fragmented, and
- V. conflicts arise between houses owned by one family and those owned by two families.

6. Not providing options to continue livelihoods.

As all the sites were restricted to 10, 15 and 20 perches, it affected people’s cultivations and home gardening practices. 10 families settled at Ruwandeniya explained that they do not have a livelihood option. Previously they had engaged in paddy, tea, and coffee cultivation. Hence, the absence of a proper income generation activity affected them drastically.

One resident in the Ruwandeniya relocation site who had returned from Dubai after working as a domestic servant for one and a half years stated that she was unemployed. 112 families were identified to be unemployed which will become a serious problem in the long run. A divisional secretariat official from Aranayake stated the following:

The most significant barrier for livelihood recovery is the change of life style as a result of the new post relocation environment. Day to day life changed dramatically for the new extended period of time spent in the camp environment. (personal communication, D. Gamage, May 19, 2020)

The loss of livelihoods severely impacted families headed by women. One participant from the Podape GN stated that all her belongings were buried by the landslide, and that she was in poverty. For her, there were no livelihood options, no productive investments, and she was vulnerable to chronic poverty. Also, she was facing an increase in expenditure and loss of access to necessities.

7. Absence of policy.

The District Secretary of the Kegalle District, expressed the following views on displacement;

Without [a] proper [local] framework for disaster resettlement, [we] cannot expect adequate positive [results]. Hence, how [can we] align local instrument into [the] global set up? Therefore, I propose, this [as the] time to generate disaster induced displacement guidelines, [and to set up] polices [for] disaster management [in] Sri Lanka” (personal communication, W.M.A Wanasooriya, December 27, 2017)

Hence, in conclusion, the following recommendations can be made regarding the Aranayake relocation project.

- i. Introduce policies to demolish or acquire houses/ property in high risk zones.
- ii. Introduce a legal base to evict people from high risk zones.
- iii. Provide temporary shelters to residents in high risk zones.
- iv. Provide land ownership to residents in high risk zones.

Conclusion

In conclusion, policy level discussion on resettlement should be made to enable frameworks, guidelines, and policies for disaster-induced resettlement. This would limit the drawbacks identified in this paper. The United Nations Disaster Risks Reduction (UNDRR, 2019) mentions “human mobility, displacement, evacuation, and relocation as priority questions in the further development of normative instruments” (non-legal binding documents such as guiding principles, frameworks and policies) (p. 10). Here, clearly articulated normative instruments on Internal Displacement needed to be upgraded giving priority to IDP matters. Accordingly, future investments need to pay more attention to human mobility for the sustainable management of displacement related issues. These challenges should be taken into consideration when providing solutions and taking necessary action.

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